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The Supreme Court and Individual
Liberties Since 1952
By PAuL A. PORTER*
The quiet hall of the Supreme Court of the United States
has witnessed many decisive battles in each period of our history.
Marshall established the supremacy of the national government.
Slavery and Reconstruction were the passionate issues of the
Taney and Chase courts. The Hughes era dealt with problems
of economic regulation and social welfare. In the last decade, as
central government has necessarily added to its responsibilities
and mission, the civil and political rights of individuals became
dominant. These issues have international significance at a time
when conflicting ideologies compete for the uncommitted peo-
ples of the world. A ruthless lust for power and conquest by the
communist complex has created an environment of fear, suspicion
and insecurity in our land.
Civil liberties, therefore, are now the focus of the Supreme
Court's burden in recent years. Deciding these basic constitu-
tional concepts in a period of tension understandably produces
emotional reactions of anguish or dismay.
Recently the Chief Justices of the several States criticized
the Court for allegedly usurping state authority. The American
Bar Association called upon Congress to "remedy" decisions
which involve communists (and, incidentally, civil liberties),
claiming that these decisions displayed a solicitude toward
subversives and thus endanger national security. Bills have been
introduced in Congress to repeal particular decisions-almost
all in the field of civil rights. Southerners are angry at the Court.
They contend that the Court is rewriting the Constitution to ac-
commodate individual members' social views. By contrast, others
are critical of the Court for failing consistently to protect in-
dividual rights.
* LL.B., University of Kentucky. Attorney, Washington, D.C. Formerly
chairman, FCC; Special Ambassador in the Near East.
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Too often, many of these critics do not look at facts. I pro-
pose that we do just that-examine the Court's recent record on
the vital issue of individual rights, and see which criticisms seem
justified. The 1952 Term offers a good starting point for the
Court's personnel has changed since then.
In 1952, the Court consisted of five members who were
Roosevelt appointees and 4 named by Truman. Today, only 4 of
these 9 remain. Chief Justice Warren, ex-Governor of California,
was appointed to succeed our fellow Kentuckian Fred Vinson.
John Marshall Harlan, a longtime member of a New York law
firm and a Circuit Judge, replaced Robert H. Jackson, closely
identified with the New Deal. William Brennan, member of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, replaced Sherman Minton, form-
er New Deal Senator from Indiana. Charles Evans Whittaker,
a lawyer and Judge from Kansas City, took the place of another
eminent Kentuckian, Stanley Reed. And Potter Stewart, a youth-
ful member of a distinguished Ohio family, replaced Harold
Burton, a former Mayor of Cleveland and Senator from Ohio.
After these changes, the Court had a majority appointed by
Eisenhower. The dominant figures on the Court, however, re-
mained unchanged since 1952 in the persons of Black, Frank-
furter and Douglas, each of whom now looks down from over
twenty years of service on the bench. Black and Douglas on the
one hand, and Frankfurter on the other, represent the principal
philosophical and conceptual differences which have existed on
the Court for many years. Frankfurter has stood for an approach
to liberty based upon a case to case effort to balance competing
interests, while Black and Douglas have most consistently sup-
ported, in absolute terms, a preference for the Bill of Rights.
The work of the Court since 1952 occupies sixteen bound
volumes. A large percentage of the pages in these volumes deal
with individual liberties and we could hardly hope to cover all
of this ground in a semester, much less in an hour. I propose" to
talk here about certain aspects of individual liberties which
have been the center of controversy in recent years. Even in
these areas it is not possible to survey the cases, but I shall cite
some for illustration, without attempting to mention others
which are equally important.
While criticism of the Court has been directed at diverse
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areas, the two principal targets have been its treatment of racial
segregation and internal subversion. I propose to first discuss
what the Court has done in the field of segregation. Then we
shall consider aspects of the subversive problem-particularly the
procedural rights of government employees and the First Amend-
ment rights of accused persons. These areas, where the Court
is currently under intense fire, provide a testing ground for as-
sessment of the Court's work in adjudicating citizens' individual
liberties.
Segregation
Of all the areas of individual liberties, equal protection of
the laws is certainly the most clamorously debated. It is the
subject of bitter controversy although in every important case
dealing with segregation the Court has been unanimous, a phe-
nomenon in recent years. Indeed, in this year's Little Rock1 opin-
ion, the Brown2 decision of 1954 was expressly reaffirmed with the
concurrence of all of the new members who had not sat in 1954
except for Justice Stewart, not yet sitting.8
The Fourteenth Amendment laid down the rule that the
States must treat all citizens equally. Subject to this rule, each
state could set up any political, educational or social system its
people desired. The Southern states chose separation. But the
rule of separation was always open to challenge whenever and
wherever it produced inequality. Inequality can be of two kinds:
tangible-which is measured in physical terms, and intangible,
which is as vital as tangible, but must be gauged in terms of
psychological and other subjective factors. These cannot be pre-
cisely measured. In Plessy v. Ferguson,4 decided in 1896, the
question before the Court was whether separate seating in rail-
road trains was "equal". The Court found there was physical
equality. But it was claimed that there was inequality from a
social or psychological point of view, because segregation placed
Negroes in an inferior status. The Court then rejected this claim
with the following comment:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
1 Cooper v. Aaron, 858 U. S. 1 (1958).
2347 U. S. 483 (1954).
3 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
4163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of any-
thing found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it...
For many decades after Plessy, the Court condoned this
ruling without further consideration. In the meantime, the Court
gradually began giving a new meaning to "equality" in decisions
holding that Negroes were being discriminated against. Discri-
mination, of course, is unconstitutional even under Plessy. In the
field of public education, the Court in a series of decisions
found that Negroes were not in fact being treated equally, and
it therefore held the educational programs to be unconstitutional
violations of the "separate but equal" rule of Plessy.6
In 1954, in the Brown case and its companion cases, the Court
finally reconsidered the validity of the "separate but equal" rule
of Plessy as applied, not to railroad seats, but to public schools.
There was no discrimination in the sense of the earlier school
cases because of findings of fact by the lower courts that the
schools' tangible facilities were equal. Only the question of in-
tangible equality was at issue.
In 1895 psychological knowledge was rudimentary. Much has
been learned since about the importance of intangible factors
affecting motivation, ability to learn and work, financial success,
and other important aspects of life. These new facts were crucial
to the Court's decision. On this point, I quote what the Court
found:
, To separate them from others of similar age and qualifi-
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done....
Segregation of white and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children.
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law;
for the policy of separating the races is-usually interpreted
as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segrega-
tion with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of Negro
5 Id. at 551.
6 E.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.7
Thus the Court's long series of decisions outlawi'ng discrimina-
tion against Negroes culminated in a finding that, at least in ed-
ucation, separation itself has proven to be discrimination, even
though the states have attempted to make physical facilities
equal.
Is the Court's decision in 1954 hopelessly inconsistent with
the principles expressed in Plessy? In the narrow sense, the
answer must be "yes". The Court in Brown rejected all "incon-
sistent" language in Plessy, and there is a marked difference in
approach in the two decisions. But Plessy did recognize that
"separate but equal" was valid only if it actually preserved equal-
ity. There was no convincing showing of inequality-tangible or
intangible-with respect to railroad seating. But the door was
at least theoretically open to such a showing. Moreover, trans-
portation and schools are very different things. Psychological
factors play a far larger part in learning than they do in trans-
portation. The Court in Brown needed to do no more than decide
that, on the basis of different facts and findings, a showing of
psychological inequality had been made out which had not been
established a half century ago. In short, Brown does not really
represent a new constitutional principle; it is a case where the
plaintiffs proved that, although their schools were apparently
equal, the nature of the education received was not, and there-
fore they had been denied the equal protection of the law.
In my judgment, the segregation cases, however revolution-
ary in social effect, are not really revolutionary in a constitutional
sense. The Court has not rewritten the Constitution; it has merely
held, as it has in many other situations, that new facts may give
new effect to an old constitutional command. Critics may de-
nounce the social consequences of the holdings, but constitution-
al scholars have no basis, in my view, for claiming any radical
departure from the application of orthodox principles of judicial
interpretation.
Subversion: Procedural Rights of Government Employees
The problem of Communism and subversion is almost as emo-
tionally charged as that of segregation. Cases dealing with sub-
7 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
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version range over many categories of law. They include labor
law, deportation, taxation, free speech and due process. We can-
not hope to discuss them all. I shall, therefore, speak of two of
the most vital problems which have occasioned substantial
litigation before the Court in the field of individual liberties.
The first is the procedural rights of alleged subversives as those
rights have been challenged in the field of government employ-
ment. The second is the First Amendment rights of alleged sub-
versive persons.
In the fall-out of the Second World War, the federal govern-
ment and some of the state governments undertook programs
seeking to insure the "loyalty" of their employees. These pro-
grams were aimed at keeping out of government employment
those persons who might be deemed disloyal, risky, or otherwise
unsuitable from the point of view of security. These programs
raised unprecedented problems for the Court. In 1952, I argued
the first test of the procedural aspects of the loyalty program to
reached the Supreme Court-the case of Bailey v. Richardson.8
I urged the Court to determine the constitutionality of the govern-
ment's action in discharging an employee named Dorothy Bailey-
a discharge which in effect branded her as disloyal to her country
-upon hearsay "evidence" from nameless and faceless informers
whom she had no opportunity to confront or to answer and de-
spite her testimony under oath that the allegations were false.
With one Justice not participating, the Court split four-to-four
and the constitutional issue remained unresolved while similar
discharges continued unabated.
What has been the course of the Court since the Bailey case?
Has the passage of seven years brought an authoritative pro-
nouncement as to any aspect of the loyalty program and has the
Court afforded any significant procedural rights to persons in-
volved in loyalty programs, state or federal?
With respect to state loyalty programs, the Court has placed
two very narrow limitations upon the power to discharge. In
Wieman v. Updegraff,9 the Court had before it a loyalty oath
which required employees to disaffirm membership in disloyal
organizations even if they had no knowledge of the purpose or
nature of the organization. The Court held this oath to be arbitr-
8341 U.S. 918 (1952).
9344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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ary and a deprivation of due process of law because it indiscri-
minately classified the innocent along with the "guilty". E a
later case, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,0 a college
teacher employed by New York City was discharged on the sole
ground that, having been asked by a committee of Congress to
state whether or not he was a member of the Communist Party,
he refused, upon the Fifth Amendment. Without notice or hear-
ing, he was automatically'discharged because of his invocation of
a federal constitutional right, without more. The Court pointed
out that since Slochower's action in relying on the Fifth Amend-
ment could not be taken as a confession of guilt, there was nothing
whatever to support the discharge. In other words, the Court
held the discharge an arbitrary denial of due process because it
lacked any rational basis at all.
But against these narrow decisions on the side of the em-
ployee, we find others permitting the states to condenn and dis-
charge employees.
In Belan v. Board of Education"l and Lerner v. Casey, 2 the
Court upheld in broad terms the power of states to dismiss for
refusal to answer questions by state agencies. In Beilan, a teacher
was discharged for "incompetency" for refusal to answer the
school superintendent's questions as to Communist party mem-
bership. In Lerner, a subway conductor was discharged for
"doubtful loyalty" after he refused, on the basis of the Fifth
Amendment, to answer a question propounded by a state agency
as to whether he was a member of the party. The Court dis-
tinguished the Slochower case on the ground that it referred only
to a discharge based solely upon exercise of a federal right in an
investigation having nothing to do with the teacher's fitness-an
action which could not be taken to evidence anything. The Court
left the states free to require answers to questions as to party
membership under their own authority, and to draw adverse con-
clusions from silence, even silence on constitutional grounds.
So much for the state loyalty programs. With respect to the
federal loyalty program, the Court since Bailey has placed limita-
tions on the applicability of the program by its construction of
the governing statutes and internal regulations. In Peters v.
10350 U.S. 551 (1956).
11357 U.S. 399 (1958).
12857 U.S. 568 (1958).
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Hobby 3 and Service v. Dulles,"4 the Court rejected so-called
post-audit discharges where the original finding of loyalty was
reversed by unauthorized procedure. And in Cole v. Young, 5
the Court held that the Congress did not intend to apply the
loyalty program to non-sensitive government positions. But al-
though persistent efforts continued, the'Court could not be in-
duced to decide the more fundamental issue of whether dis-
charges could be based upon secret and undisclosed information
and anonymous informers.'(
On June I of this year, the Court decided Vitarelli v. Seaton,1
7
involving the discharge of an Interior Department employee as-
signed to teach handicrafts to natives on remote Pacific Islands.
Vitarelli was discharged on security grounds because of his al-
leged association with communists and communist causes. He re-
ceived a "hearing" at which no witnesses or evidence supported
the charges but at which he himself was questioned extensively
on his social, political and religious views. He was then fired.
By departmental order, the Secretary of the Interior had pre-
viously established certain procedures for use in security cases.
Among these were (a) a specific statement of charges; (b) a
hearing with reasonable restrictions as to the relevancy, com-
petency and materiality of matters considered; (c) the right
to cross-examine any witness offered in support of the charges.
Although no statute required these procedures, the Court held
that the Secretary was bound by his own regulations, and the
Court held further that the wide-ranging examination into Vitarel-
lis social, political and religious beliefs denied him rights granted
by the order, in that neither the regulation concerning the state-
ment of charges nor the requirements for an orderly hearing were
observed. The Court said further that while the right of the ac-
cused to cross-examination did not give an employee the op-
portunity to examine confidential informants, not all those who
furnished the Department with evidence against Vitarelli were
in that status, and therefore this regulation had also been vio-
lated. Vitarelli was ordered reinstated.
It will be observed that none of the grounds for the decision
13349 U.S. 331 (1955).
14354 U.S. 3863 (1957).
15 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
16Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
1779 Sup. Ct. 968 (1959).
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touched on the constitutional validity of discharges based upon
anonymous informers and other conventional requirements of due
process. But in holding that the security hearing board departed
from the requirements of a meaningful hearing, when it asked
questions as to views on religious and social matters, the Court
hinted that there were some substantive limits on inquiries into
associations and beliefs. In what is probably the opinion's most
significant passage, a footnote, the Court quotes a series of ques-
tions on political and social views, and comments:
It is not apparent how any of the above matters could
be material to a consideration of the question whether
petitioner's retention in government service would be consis-
tent with national security.
Aside from this footnote dictum, the Court has not yet placed
any significant curbs on the loyalty-security program as we have
known it. The constitutional issues presented the Court in 1952
still remain undecided.
Free Speech and Subversion
The field of individual rights covers many different matters.
Some are of profound importance while others may be less es-
sential in a democracy. A supremely important individual right is
the right of political expression guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. Without this right, our democracy is not a democracy.
The fear of subversion that has gripped our country in the
past decade has put great pressure upon the fundamental right
of free speech. It is, therefore, to be expected that in the area of
free speech, we shall meet the most significant test of the Court's
treatment of individual liberties.
Shortly after World War II, when the frustrations of the
cold war produced a series of congressional acts in the field, the
Supreme Court in a series of decisions placed several restrictions
upon the First Amendment rights of alleged subversives and
greatly expanded the power of the government to suppress free
speech. These decisions, which I shall not discuss because they
occurred before 1952, are headed by the Dennis8 case, permitting
punishment of advocacy of overthrow of the government by force
and violence, and the Douds'9 case, in which it was held that
Is Dennis v. United States, 841 U.S. 494 (1951).
19 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 839 U.S. 382 (1950).
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communists could be excluded from posts in labor organizations.
For a period after 1952, First Amendment issues remained re-
latlvely quiet in the Court. But in 1957 and 1958, a group of cases
was decided which appeared to represent a new trend toward in-
creased protection of individual rights.
In NAACP v. Alabama,20 the Court gave broad affirmance to
the right of association for political or other purposes. Alabama
sought to put the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People out of business by forcing it to reveal the names
and addresses of its Alabama agents. The Court found this law to
be an invalid interference with the freedom of speech, assembly
and association guaranteed by the First Amendment as incor-
porated in the Fourteenth Amendment. It held that Alabama had
demonstrated no sufficient state interest to justify this repression.
That enforced exposure or disclosure may violate First Amend-
ment rights was also recognized in dictum in the Supreme Court's
1957 decisions on legislative investigations, Watkins v. United
States,2 and Sweezy v. New Hampshire.2 2 In Watkins, it was
held that a labor leader could not be convicted of contempt for
refusing to answer questions by the House Committee on Un-
American Activities as to persons he knew as members of the
Communist Party. The Court held that legislative investigations
are subject to the Bill of Rights, but it did not reach the issue
whether the Committee could constitutionally ask questions about
party membership. It held instead that the questions had not
been shown to be pertinent to the subject the Committee was
authorized to investigate. In Sweezy, New Hampshire attempted
to require a teacher to answer questions touching on his teaching
in order to determine if he were "subversive". The Court held
the questions infringed free speech and were not justified by
any legitimate state interest.
Another important free speech case the following year was
Speiser v. Randall.23 California gave its World War II veterans a
property tax exemption. But as a condition of obtaining this
exemption, the state required them to take an oath that they
did not advocate the overthrow of the government by violence.
20357 U.S. 449 (1958).
21354 U.S. 178 (1957).
22354 U.S. 234 (1957).
23357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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Appellants refused to take the oath, arguing that the requirement
was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
The Court began by recognizing that a discriminatory tax
exemption was necessarily an inhibition on free speech. The
California courts had held that the oath referred only to such
speech or advocacy as might constitutionally be punished by
either the state or the federal government, 24 and the Supreme
Court assumed that California might constitutionally deny a tax
exemption for conduct which it could punish. But the Court held
that the method by which tax exemption was denied was uncon-
stitutional. The oath was invalid because it placed an affirmative
burden on the taxpayer to show he was not engaging in unlaw-
fil speech or advocacy. The Court thought it unfair to require
claimants for exemptions in effect to show they do not engage
in unlawful activities. The Court concluded as follows:
[W] e hold that when the constitutional right to speak
is sought to be deterred by a State's general taxing program
due process demands that the speech be unencumbered
until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify
its inhibition.
2 5
I have cited the Court's reasoning in the Speiser case because
that reasoning is of greater significance than what was actually
decided. Instead of giving a definite meaning to the First Amend-
ment, a majority of the Court has given it relative one. Whether
or not a law restricting freedom of speech is valid depends, under
this interpretation, upon a process of balancing the interest in
free speech against the interests of the State in suppressing
free speech. A similar pattern is found in other free speech cases
of the period which do not involve subversion.
Two cases decided some few weeks ago have applied this
balancing test in the field of political expression. The result
in each case has been to hold that restraints may be imposed
upon individual political rights, despite the First Amendment,
because the state has an expressed -interest in suppression.
In Barenblatt v. United States,6 the Supreme Court was called
upon to review the contempt conviction of an instructor at Vassar
24341 U.S. 494 (1951).
25 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1958).
26 79 Sup. Ct. 1081 (1959).
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College who was called before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities. Barenblatt was asked whether he was or
had ever been a member of the Communist Party. He refused
to respond, justifying his refusal by reference to the First Amend-
ment. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court held that his
refusal could be punished as a crime. While other issues loom im-
portant in the case, the First Amendment question was para-
mount. The Court recognized at the outset that the investigative
power of Congress is subject to the First Amendment and that
questioning about political activities, such as Communist Party
membership, is an infringement of the right of political expression
different only in degree from a law punishing such membership.
Hence, the Court considered the issue in the case to be whether
the invasion of Barenblatt's First Amendment rights was justified.
As a guide to decision, the Court laid down this formula:
Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar govern-
mental interrigation, resolution of the issue always involves
a balancing by the courts of the competing private and pub-
lic issues at stake in the particular circumstance shown.
27
In proceeding to balance the interest at stake in Barenblatt's
case, the Court declared that Congress has wide power to legis-
late in the field of Communist activity-a power deriving from the
national right of self-preservation. The Communist Party, the
Court said, is not an ordinary political party but an organization
devoted to the forcible overthrow of the government. Although
Barenblatt was employed in the field of education, the Court
said that the questions he was asked were not an attempt to con-
trol what was being taught at a college but to determine the
extent of danger from the Communist Party in this country. And,
proceeding to its self-appointed balancing task, the Court ma-
jority held that the interest of the United States in self-preserva-
tion was greater than Barenblatt's interest in avoiding exposure
and consequently restriction of his political activities.
In the case of Uphaus v. Wyman, 8 decided the same day,
the Court employed a similar approach with reference to the
First Amendment and state investigatory power. The Attorney
General of New Hampshire, acting as a one-man investigating
27 Id. at 1093.
2879 Sup. Ct. 1040 (1959).
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committee, was probing alleged subversive activities in the state.
Uphaus was an official of an organization called World Fellow-
ship which maintained a summer camp in New Hampshire at
which visitors gave political talks. He was asked for, and refused
to provide, the names of all persons who attended the camp.
It was this refusal which New Hampshire punished and which
the Supreme Court undertook to consider.
By a five to four vote, the Court held that although the New
Hampshire investigation was directly concerned with political
activity, i.e., political speeches to a private group, this investiga-
tion was justified by the predominant interest of the State. The
State, the Court held, could validly inquire whether there were
gatherings of suspected subversives within its borders. The
majority held that the governmental interest in self-preservation
was sufficiently compelling to subordinate free speech and its
associated privacy of persons who were guests at the camp.
The Uphaus and Barenblatt cases put the earlier and very
similar Watkins and Sweezy cases into the shade. Watkins turns
out to have been only a decision barring punishment for refusal
to answer questions not clearly pertinent to the subject under in-
quiry. Sweezy turns out to have held no more than that an in-
vestigation into the field of education may not be conducted
where the State has failed to demonstrate or clearly express any
legitimate interest justifying the investigation. As soon as the
questions are pertinent and the interest of the State is asserted
to be that of self-preservation, the Watkins and Sweezy cases
appear to be inapplicable.
It is true that the Court was dealing, not with laws prohibiting
speech, but only with exposure of views and associations. But
the Court itself has recognized that exposure as such is a direct
infringement of First Amendment rights. This was its unanimous
holding in the NAACP case. We must consider, therefore, that
the rule laid down by these cases would be applied to laws
against speech as well.
Conclusion
With these conflicting decisions before us, what" can we say
to the Court's work in the field of individual liberties? In segrega-
tion, the Court steadfastly has moved toward granting the Negro
equality but it has done so within the established constitutional
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framework. With respect to subversives, up to the present time,
it has granted virtually no constitutional procedural rights.
Some decisions, as we have seen, have properly redressed a mis-
carriage of justice on technical grounds (which Congress could
reverse) but the Court has invoked no significant constitutional
restrictions on the procedures employed by the federal govern-
ment or the states in the so-called loyalty field.
When we turn to the First Amendment rights of political
minorities, including suspected communists, we find that the
Court has clearly and unmistakably subordinated these rights to
the claimed interests of the state whenever the two seem to clash.
If the Court has thus been cautious in evoking constitutional
principles in these areas, what is the basis of so much criticism?
In the case of segregation, we have a profound disagreement
based not primarily on constitutional principles but on social
concepts. I do not share the views of such critics but I certainly
can understand and sympathize with their concern for the vast
social readjustments required to comply with the Court's man-
date.
But criticism of the Court's relatively few decisions relating
to the rights of subversives is a different matter. These criticisms
stem largely from those who feel that persons or groups whom
they dislike or suspect, such as alleged subversives, have no
rights under our Constitution.
No one complains when a court insists upon a fair trial for the
ordinary citizen. But if the court reverses the conviction of an
unpopular individual, either because he is thought guilty of
political heresy or has committed some loathsome crime, then
efforts are made to restrict the court's power or limit its jurisdic-
tion. Some critics apparently feel that rapists or communists
should not be tried according to due process principles applicable
to other citizens.
Then there are others who contend that the Court has fallen
short of enforcing the Bill of Rights in the generous and glorious
spirit which is needed for constant revitalization of our liberties.
The fact of the matter is that the Court does seem to have limited
these liberties, including the most prized one-freedom of speech.
These values should be protected unless the government can
show in each case a clear and immediate interest in their cur-
1959]
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tailment. Black and Douglas would maintain that these rights are
absolute and that the greater the danger, the more important the
Constitution's protection.
In some ways, the Court's treatment of the First Amendment
manifests a retreat from the doctrines established by earlier
courts. Under the Holmes-Brandeis clear and present danger
doctrine, infringements of the First Amendment were not per-
mitted unless the danger to the state from action resulting from
the exercise of First Amendment rights was so immediate that
time for adequate discussion before such action would not be
possible.
The Court has now ignored this classic action test. The ma-
jority in Barenblatt and in Uphaus does not even mention this
concept. It thus seems to have rejected the Holmes-Brandeis
thesis that so long as there is time for discussion, the best demo-
cratic weapon against bad ideas is more free speech, out of which
the ultimate truth may emerge. And the Court seems to have
thus far denied the First Amendment any preferred place in
our constitutional scheme. Instead it has now declared that, de-
spite the First Amendment's admonition about "no law", govern-
ment may restrict political expression whenever the majority
believe it desirable, even though there is no showing that any
danger of action from the political expression is immediate or
even exists. The Court has left the First Amendment to be en-
forced on an ad hoe basis when and if a majority believes that
a particular exercise of speech ought to be repressed. In times of
tension, this may have the effect of suppressing unpopular or
even new ideas.
Criticism of the Supreme Court is of course to be expected.
In a democratic society, it should even be encouraged. The
Court is after all a human institution. But it is the responsibility,
particularly of lawyers, to predicate their comments upon in-
formed analyses and reasoned conclusions. It is morever the
duty of all citizens to recognize that the institution of the Court,
despite any disagreement with its actions, demands our respect
and support. For true liberty reposes in the hearts and minds of
our people and the Supreme Court of the United States is free-
dom's ultimate custodian.
